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Introduction 
It is easy to understand the opposition to liberalized trade in established markets: Domestic 
producers loose from increased foreign competition. It is harder to understand the opposition to 
creating markets, including international markets, where they currently do not exist. Many 
economists and policymakers have proposed establishing tradable carbon permits to decrease the 
cost of reducing global carbon emissions. Since there currently are no enforceable ceilings on 
emissions, the right to emit carbon has no market value. Emissions permits are not commodities. 
The usual forces that oppose market liberalization are obviously not present in this (proposed) 
market. 
Environmentalists, who favor reducing carbon emissions, frequently oppose international 
trade in emissions permits. It is puzzling that the group most in favor of a proposed change 
(reductions in emissions) is also the most opposed to a method of achieving that change cheaply 
(via trade). There may be a rational basis for this opposition. The theory of the second best alerts 
us to the possibility that in a world with distortions, opening a new market may lower welfare. If 
there is a plausible second-best argument against trade in carbon permits, we have not found it. 
There is probably an emotional basis for environmentalists' opposition to tradable permits. The 
environmental problems we face are related to growth, which is related to the existence of liberal 
markets. A misunderstanding of the relation between markets and pollution may lead some 
environmentalists to incorrectly equate environmental deterioration with market liberalization of 
any kind. Certainly there is a deep skepticism amongst environmentalists regarding the merits of 
markets. 
Economists advance the usual abstract arguments in favor of markets to explain why 
internationally tradable permits would be helpful in achieving reduced carbon emissions. These 
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arguments are probably correct, but they are not convincing to people who are ill-disposed 
towards markets in general. Economists' involvement in the debate over tradable permits differs 
from their involvement in previous debates over trade liberalization, e.g. during the Uruguay 
Round of the GATT negotiations. In both cases, the fundamental argument for market 
liberalization is theoretical. However, during previous trade negotiations, these theoretical 
arguments were backed by many empirical studies. Those studies attempted to measure, either 
econometrically or by means of simulation, the trade and welfare effects of various forms of 
liberalization. The validity of these empirical results is always debatable, but their concreteness 
sometimes makes them persuasive. 
Although trade in carbon permits is potentially important, the possibility of this trade has 
led to little empirical work. The obvious explanation for the absence of empirical work is that the 
relevant market is missing. The existence of a world market for wheat makes it relatively 
straightforward to estimate supply and demand curves that can be used to study the effects of 
liberalized trade in wheat. We cannot use the same procedure to study the effects of creating a 
market where none currently exists. 
 Nevertheless, we do observe cross-country and intertemporal variation in carbon 
emissions, together with changes in inputs such as capital and labor. We can use this data to 
estimate a relation between emissions and income, and thus obtain an estimate of the marginal 
value of carbon emissions in different countries. 
 These estimates enable us to compare the level of income when each country's emissions 
are restricted to a given level, with the level of income achieved when the country is able to trade 
permits. The difference in income is a measure of the welfare gains from trade. We also compare 
the amount of reductions in total emissions that could be achieved with and without trade when 
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each country's income is held fixed at a given level. This comparison may be especially 
interesting to people who care more about reducing emissions than about increasing income. 
 The conclusions from this empirical exercise are speculative. However, they give us an 
estimate of the magnitude of the importance of trade in carbon permits. The simplicity and 
transparency of our model is appealing. More complicated models, e.g. those based on 
optimization and engineering estimates, do a better job of describing some aspects of the world. 
However, the complexity of these models makes their conclusions difficult to assess. 
 In the following, we estimate a system of simultaneous equations in which national 
income and CO2 emissions are endogenously determined by country-specific characteristics, 
including levels of capital, labor and technology. We view pollution and GDP as joint outputs of 
a production function that depends on capital, labor and technology, variables, which we treat as 
exogenous. We estimate a national revenue function by regressing GDP on capital, labor, 
technology and emissions. This function represents the efficiency frontier between income and 
emissions, for given levels of the exogenous variables. A country's environmental policies and 
economic structure, which we proxy using per capita energy consumption, determine the 
equilibrium level of GDP and of emissions. 
 We use the estimated model to simulate prices and efficiency gains under tradable 
emissions permits. We suppose that countries enter into an international agreement which 
allocates CO2 emissions permits, and that this agreement supersedes the mechanism that would 
otherwise determine the country's emissions (the point on its efficiency frontier). The joint 
production function (which depends on technology and factor endowments) has not been altered 
by the agreement. Thus, we can use the estimated revenue function to determine the effect on 
GDP of a change in emissions. This function implies a demand for emissions permits, which we 
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use to calculate the price of permits when trade is permitted. We simulate the efficiency gains 
resulting from trade in permits. 
Background 
The Kyoto Protocol requires that industrialized countries reduce their collective emissions of 
greenhouse gasses by 5.2% of 1990 levels by the period 2008-2012. The country-specific targets 
in the Kyoto Protocol may be difficult for some nations to achieve. There may be considerable 
cross-country variation in marginal abatement costs, and the strength of environmental lobbies 
also differs. Emissions Trading, which was proposed to enable signatories to achieve reductions 
efficiently, allows developed countries to trade emissions credits amongst themselves. This trade 
makes sense only amongst those countries that have agreed to quotas, predominately the OECD 
countries. We therefore include only these countries in our empirical model. 
 The US Acid Rain Program, which allows trade in SO2 emissions, is an important 
experiment in tradable pollution rights [9]. The US experience with the SO2 program suggests 
that trade in CO2 permits could have considerable benefits. 
 There have been many attempts to estimate the costs of reducing carbon emissions, and 
several attempts to synthesize the estimation results. If countries were allowed to trade emissions 
quotas, the equilibrium price would be determined by the costs of reducing emissions. We use 
the estimates from previous costs studies as a basis for comparison of the estimates of quota 
prices that we obtain from a simple econometric model. 
 Nordhaus cite [7] collects estimates of marginal costs of abatement and estimates a 
relation between these costs and the percentage reduction of emissions. Bohm and Larsen [1] use 
this relation to estimate the price of tradable permits and the efficiency gain for intra-European 
trade. They estimate an equilibrium price of $240 per ton of carbon if only Western European 
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countries trade. Including the remaining OECD countries, China, Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union causes the estimated price to fall to $33.5 per ton of carbon. Larsen and Shah [5] 
calculate the price of emissions if all countries participate in trade ($58 per ton of carbon) and if 
only OECD countries participate ($181 per ton). 
The Empirical Model 
We estimate a revenue function and an emissions function using 1975-1990 panel data for 24 
OECD countries.1 We assume that GDP and CO2 emissions are joint products, produced by 
country-specific factors: capital, labor and technology. This joint production function determines 
the trade-off between emissions and GDP for given levels of factors. We refer to this frontier as 
the revenue function. The second equation is the “emissions function,” which determines the 
equilibrium point on the efficiency frontier. 
 To conserve notation we suppress time and country subscripts in describing the model. 
The joint production function is F(Y,E) = G(C,K,L,T,Pop), where Y = GDP (measured in 
constant 1987 US$); E = Industrial CO2 Emissions (in kt, i.e. thousands of metric tons)2; C is a 
country specific dummy; K = Physical Capital Stock (in constant 1987 US$); L = Labor force; T 
= Patent applications (a proxy for technology3); and Pop = Country Population. We invert the 
relation F()=G() to obtain the revenue function Y = f(C,K,L,T,Pop,E), which represents the 
                                                 
1 Karp and Liu cite [4] describe the data and provide a more complete report of the estimation 
results. That paper also discusses in detail the “emissions function” and its relation to the 
literature on the environmental Kuznets curve. 
2 These include emissions arising from burning fossil fuels and manufacturing cement, and 
contributions from other solid, liquid and gas fuels and gas flaring. The data also includes 
emissions from commercial and residential sources, but not from changes in land-use [8], [10]. 
This data accounts for approximately 94% of the measure of “Total anthropogenic emissions 
excluding land-use change and forestry” found in [2]. 
3 Gardner and Joutz cite [3] discuss the relative merits of using patent applications and R&D 
expenditures as proxies for technological innovation, and recommend the former. 
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feasible trade-off between income and emissions, for given levels of the other variables. We 
divide all variables (except the dummy) by Pop to obtain per capita variables, and estimate a log-
linear relation. 
 The estimation equation for the revenue function is 
 yis = ci+α1kis + α2lis + α3tis + α4eis + ε1is. (1) 
Lower case variables y,k,l,t and e are logarithm of the per capita of the corresponding upper case 
variables, ci is the country specific dummy, ε1is is the error associated with country i in period s, 
and the parameters αj, j =1, 4 are to be estimated. We view Y and E as endogenous and we treat 
K, L, T and Pop as exogenous. These explanatory variables are stock variables. Thus, we treat 
their levels as predetermined in a period. We include the country dummy to account for country-
specific variables such as arable land and cultural factors. The revenue function describes the 
technological trade-off between emissions and income. 
 A second relation, the emissions function, describes the “social trade-off” between 
income and emissions. In principle, the emissions function should include variables which proxy 
political constraints (e.g., membership in environmental groups, relative income of workers in 
“dirty” industries). Much of this kind of information is not available for our sample. In an effort 
to improve the specification of the emissions function and maintain identification, we include 
commercial energy use (kt of oil equivalent), N, as a regressor in the emissions function. We 
view N as a proxy for the structure of the economy, i.e. an indication of the opportunity cost of 
reducing emissions. 
 We estimate a log-linear specification of the emissions function 
 eis = d +β1yis + β2nis + ε2is. (2) 
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The variable nis is the log of per capita energy consumption in country i, year s, d is a constant, 
and ε2is is the error term. 
Estimation Results 
In order to provide a basis for comparison, we first estimate equation (1) using ordinary least 
squares (OLS), and then jointly estimate equations (1) and (2) using three stage least squares 
(3SLQ). 
 Tables 1 and 2 report the OLS and 3SLQ results, respectively, with standard in 
parentheses. 
Table 1: OLS Estimates of Equation 1 
Parameter Name Estimate 
α1 (k = log of Capital) .534  
 (0.024)* 
α2 (l = log of Labor) .3385  
 (0.022) 
α3 (t = log of Technology) .0558  
 (0.006) 
α4 (e = log of Emissions) .0452  
 (0.013) 
R2 .99 
*Numbers in parenthesis denotes standard errors 
 
Table 2: 3SLQ Estimates 
Parameter Name Estimate 
α1 (k = log of Capital) .517 
 (0.025)* 
α2 (l = log of Labor) .287 
 (0.031) 
α3 (t = log of Technology) .0625 
 (0.007) 
α4 (e= log of Emissions) .106 
 (0.027) 
β1 (y = log of GDP) -.216 
 (0.039) 
β2 (n = log of Energy Consumption) 1.179 
 (0.038) 
*Numbers in parenthesis denotes standard errors. 
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 Our parameter estimates for equation (1) are comparable to the augmented Solow growth 
model estimated by Nonneman and Vanhoudt cite [6] for OECD countries. Their estimated 
production function is Y = .33 .4 .08 .15K L T H , where their measure of technology, T , uses R&D 
expenditures and H is a measure of human capital. Our estimate of the elasticity with respect to 
capital is larger, and our estimate of the labor elasticity is smaller, relative to [6]. Although we 
use a different variable to measure technology, our elasticity estimate is similar to theirs. 
Simulation Results 
We use the structural model—particularly the revenue function, equation (1)—to estimate the 
effect of trade in permits. It is convenient to rewrite this equation as  
 4i i iY A Eα=  with ( ); 1 ;i i i j jA F Popσ σ α≡ ≡ −Σ ( )expi iF c≡ 1iKα 2iLα 3iTα . (3) 
The positively sloped solid curve in Figure 1 shows the graph of the revenue function for a 
particular country in the year 1990, and the negatively sloped solid curve shows the emissions 
function. The intersection of these curves, point x, represents the 1990 equilibrium. If factors of 
production and population [and thus the variable A defined in equation (3)] increase, then the 
revenue function shifts out as shown by the upwardly sloping dashed curve in Figure 1. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
Caption: Figure 1: Equilibrium with and without quotas 
 To reflect the view that emissions would increase in the absence of an agreement, the 
dashed curve labeled ( )i i iE Y N ′  represents the future (e.g., year 2010) emissions function. The 
point x´ is the equilibrium combination of emissions and income in the absence of an agreement 
to constrain emissions. 
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 An international agreement changes the regime that determines the level of emissions. If 
the agreement restricts emissions in the year 2010 to its 1990 level, the country's level of income 
without trade is given by the point z. If a country receives an allocation equal to its 1990 
emissions, but is able to trade permits, it can achieve a higher level of income, such as the point 
z´.4 
 When we use the model to calculate the equilibrium price of tradable permits, we assume 
that the percentage increase in Ai over the period 1991-2010 is the same for all countries. That is, 
Ai,2010 = λ Ai,1990 for λ > 1. There is a simple relation, described below, between the equilibrium 
price of permits and the value of λ. Therefore, in the next section we report the simulated 
equilibrium price under the (implausible) assumption that λ = 1. The reader can adjust these 
prices depending on the value of λ that seems reasonable. The efficiency gains due to trade are 
independent of the value of λ (i.e., independent of the growth of factors of production). 
Estimates of Prices and Efficiency Gains 
With tradable emissions and perfect competition, the value of marginal product of emissions in 
each country equals the world price of permits, denoted P. Using equation (3), country i's value 
of marginal product (its equilibrium inverse demand) for emissions is 4 14 i iP A Eαα −= , which 
implies the demand 
 4
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. (4) 
                                                 
4 The horizontal coordinate of z′ represents the country's quota allocation, which differs from its 
actual emissions by the amount of trade. The vertical coordinate represents the value of 
production Yi(Ei,λAi) plus of the value of sales of quota licenses. 
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Using our 3SLQ point estimate (Table 2) α4 = .106, the elasticity of demand (both for a single 
country and for the aggregate of all countries) is 1.12. Summing equation (4) over i and setting 
the result equal to the aggregate level of emissions E gives the equilibrium price ( )*P E as the 
solution to  
 4
1
* 1
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α
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 (5) 
 Table 3 reports the simulated price (1987 US$ per metric ton of CO2) when OECD 
aggregate emissions and country i’s factors (and thus Ai) equal their 1990 levels, using the OLS 
and the 3SLQ parameter estimates. (Here we set λ =1.) The second row of the table reports the 
simulated price for CO2; and the third row converts this into a price of carbon.5 The price 
estimates summarized in Section 2 refer to tons of carbon, so the third row of Table 3 should be 
used for comparison.  
Table 3: Simulated Prices 
Coefficients OLS (Table 1) 3SLS (Table 2) 
price per metric ton of CO2 $57.5 $156.8 
price per metric ton of carbon $210. $574.94 
 
 Figure 2 graphs each country's 1990 marginal product of emissions in the absence of 
trade and shows the equilibrium price (using the 3SLQ estimates). The thirteen countries whose 
marginal product of emissions is higher than the price would buy permits. Switzerland and 
                                                 
5 CO2 has a molecular weight of 12 + 2(16) = 44. Thus the ratio of the weight of CO2 to carbon is 
44
12 = 3.6667. 
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Sweden have the highest marginal product of emissions. Eleven countries, including the US, gain 
from selling permits. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 The estimated equilibrium price is primarily useful as a means of comparing our results 
with the previous literature. Our price estimates (using the assumption λ =1) are substantially 
higher than those we summarized in Section 2. The more interesting economic question concerns 
the welfare effects of allowing trade in permits. Fortunately, the answer to this question is 
independent of the value of λ. 
 In order to estimate the efficiency gain due to tradable permits, we compare a country's 
estimated GDP with and without tradable permits, given a quota allocation equal to its 1990 
emissions level. Denote *iY  as country i’s GDP when it uses the efficient level of emissions, *iE  
[i.e., the value given by equation (4)]. ( )4**i i iY A E α= . The value of its exports of permits, given 
an allocation equal to its actual 1990 emissions (Ei,1990 ) is ( )* *,1990 ,i iP E E−  where *P is the 
equilibrium price from equation (5). Under tradable permits country i’s total income is TPiY :
  ( )* * *,1990 .TPi i i iY Y P E E= + −  (6) 
The estimated level of income without trade is 4,1990 ,1990i i iY A Eα= . A measure of the efficiency 
gain due to trade is thus ,1990 ,1990
,1990
.
TP
i i
i
Y Y
Y
−  
 Figure 3 shows the efficiency gains for the countries in our sample, using the 3SLQ 
parameter estimates of equation (1). For most countries the gains are below 2% of GDP; only 
three countries gain more than 3%. For some countries, e.g. Germany, the gain is negligible; the 
United States gains 0.53%. The unweighted average of the gains for the 24 countries is 1.36%. 
 13
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
 The results above held Ai at its (estimated) 1990 level. If Ai increases in the future (the 
time at which the quota becomes binding) the equilibrium price would be higher. For example, 
suppose that Ai is replaced by λAi, λ ≥ 1 to represent an increase in factors of production and 
population. Using equation (4) and the equilibrium condition ,i iE E= Σ  it is easy to show that 
*
*
dP d
P
λ
λ= . 
 The estimated equilibrium shares and efficiency gain are independent of λ (provided that 
the value of λ is the same for each country). In the absence of trade, income is 4,1990.i iA Eαλ  With 
equal proportional growth in Ai for all i, each country's demand for emissions shifts up by the 
same amount, and its equilibrium share with trade remains the same. Since the percentage 
increase in price equals the percentage increase in λ, income under trade ( )TPiY  increases by the 
same proportion as income in the absence of trade: the efficiency gain due to tradable permits is 
independent of λ. 
Estimates of Potential Reductions and Quota Shares 
Another way to measure the efficiency gains of permit trading is to calculate the maximum 
additional reduction in emissions that can be achieved by allowing trade, without reducing 
income. If countries were to agree to limit emissions to their 1990 level, then their estimated 
future income, in the absence of trade, is 4,1990.i iA Eαλ  The parameter λ >1 represents the increase 
in their factors of production, relative to 1990 levels. 
 If the countries then agree to allow trade in permits, and attempt to reduce aggregate 
emissions, E below the 1990 level, the constraint that no country is worse off can be written  
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 4*i iA E αλ + ( )( ) 4* * ,1990.; i i i iP E E E A Eαλ µ λ− ≥  (7) 
Here µi is country i’s share of aggregate emissions. The first term on the left side of (7) is the 
value of domestic production, given the efficient level of emissions (a function of *P ). The 
second term is the value of net exports of permit. The equilibrium price ( )* ;P E λ  is proportional 
to λ and the equilibrium values *iE  are independent of λ. Therefore we can divide both sides of 
equation (7) by λ and write the constraint on income as independent of the growth parameter λ. 
 The optimization problem that determines the new agreement is 
  
iE,
min ,E
µ
 subject to 1,i iµΣ =  and equation (7). (8) 
The equilibrium price and each country's equilibrium use of emissions depend on E , but are 
independent of the allocation of quota rights. However, a country's income, and thus its 
willingness to sign an agreement, does depend on the allocation.  
 The solution to (8), i.e. the minimal level of E , is 8.06% lower than 1990 levels.6 Thus, 
tradable permits makes it possible to achieve a significantly higher reduction in emissions 
without a loss in income. This model probably overstates the actual gain, because it ignores 
transactions costs and adjustment costs which would undoubtedly be associated with a 
reallocation of emissions. Thus, our estimates of gains should be viewed as plausible upper 
bounds, rather unbiased estimates. 
 Figure 4 shows: the actual shares of emissions in 1990; the equilibrium shares when 
aggregate emissions are fixed at 1990 levels and trade in permits is allowed (identified as 
“Simulation 1”); and the optimal shares µi implied by the solution to equation (8) (identified as 
                                                 
6 Recall that in the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change, industrialized countries set 
a target for the year 2010 at 1990 levels. The Kyoto Protocol set a target at 5.2% of 1990 levels. 
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“Simulation 2”). Figure 5 shows the levels of emissions in 1990 and when aggregate emissions 
are minimized. 
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
 Several countries (notably Japan and France) receive a share of quota rights (µi) less than 
their actual share in 1990. However, they emit more under the equilibrium implied by the 
solution to equation (8) than they did in 1990. For the United States, on the other hand, the 
optimal quota share under the solution to (8) exceeds it's historical 1990 share, but the 
equilibrium share of emissions is lower. Thus, Japan and France are net buyers of quota rights, 
and the United States is a net seller. 
 The Cobb Douglas functional form for income implies that a country's equilibrium share 
of emissions, 
*
*
i
j j
E
EΣ , equals its equilibrium share of income from production, 
*
*
i
j j
Y
YΣ . Since the 
United States has approximately 35% of OECD GDP (in 1990), its share of emissions is 
approximately 35% for all the experiments. 
Conclusion 
We estimated a structural model to assess the effects of tradable permits for CO2 emissions. One 
equation in our model describes the relation between GDP and factors of production, including 
CO2 emissions. We view these emissions as representing “environmental services”, the supply of 
which is endogenous. The second equation uses income and energy consumption (a proxy for the 
structure of the economy) to explain the equilibrium supply of these “services”.   
 We assumed that an international agreement supersedes the mechanism that would, in the 
absence of the agreement, determine the endogenous supply of environmental services (the level 
of emissions). We used our estimated revenue function to simulate the equilibrium price and 
 16
efficiency gains of tradable permits, given a particular level of aggregate emissions. Our 
estimated carbon prices are two or three times as large as previous estimates, without accounting 
for growth in demand (due to growth in factors of production).  
 Some proposals aim to reduce year 2010 aggregate emissions to 1990 levels. Our results 
suggest that an additional 8% reduction in aggregate emissions could be achieved, without 
income loss, by appropriate distribution of emissions rights. This distribution gives the United 
States a larger share than it's historic level, but the US exports permits, leading to smaller US 
emissions. 
There are several limitations of our study.  We ignore both adjustment costs, which 
would require a dynamic model, and also transactions costs.  Therefore, our estimates of the 
gains from trade are more likely to represent plausible upper bounds, rather than estimates of 
expected gains.  The data limitations mean that we have been unable to include all of the 
explanatory variables that should ideally be in the model.  We used a systems estimator in an 
attempt to reduce the problem of endogeneity of regressors, but the lack of data (i.e., the lack of 
better instrumental variables) means that this problem has probably not been eliminated. 
We ignored other methods of reducing the costs of controlling stocks of greenhouse 
gasses, including the U.S. proposal to obtain credits by using “carbon sinks”.  The acceptance of 
this proposal would reduce the U.S. marginal abatement costs.  Our estimates suggest that U.S. 
marginal costs are already relatively low, and that the U.S. would be a net exporter.  Allowing 
the U.S. to receive credits for carbon sinks would shift out its export supply function, reducing 
the price of permits, and increasing the gains from trade. 
Despite these limitations, our approach has the virtue of providing a simple and easily 
understood means of addressing an important policy issue.  Our estimates suggest that tradable 
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carbon permits could substantially reduce abatement costs.  Consequently, proposals to allow 
this trade should be seriously considered in international negotiations aimed at reducing the 
dangers of global warming. 
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